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Violence and political disourse
among thé Chai Suri
JON ABBINK
1. Introduction1
l "Over there in thé fog, we see it, Shulugui.2
With our newly acquired guns we will now go there.
Why do we only sit hère and drink gèso?3
Why are we getting slow and complacent?
5 Don't think about fighting, killing and getting killed and suffering, just
go there!
I will go, I will really like to go.
Don't fight with thé Su, only with thé Bume.
Shulugui: it's not theirs, it's ours!'
( )
Are our guns only to be used for shooting buffaloes?
10 No, isn't it for thé fight for Shulugui?
I acknowledge thé generous support for fieldwork among thé Chai from WOTRO
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The mountain in the homeland from which the Chai people were chased m 1987-1988 (see
Map l on page 8).
A light alcoholic sorghum beer.
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Go tomorrow, go to fight in our country.
( )
'Were our fathers hère? Did they live hère?
Don't you hâve guns? We bought new guns and bullets, we have
enough.
We will go to clean our area, our country.
15 It should be like this; it's right.
Yesterday we only had Minishir rifles.4 Now we have acquired real
ones.
We have no other task [than to fight at Shulugui, JA],
we were there in the past.
Don't you hâve force, or strength to fight?
20 So far, we hâve only talked too much about ail this.
Our women and children were killed, our cattle was stolen.
If you don't act, you hâve no fighting spirit, no value.
Our real place, our homeland, is there [thé speaker pointing south, JA]."
These words were spoken in late 1992 by an influential eider in a speech at a
public meeting of the Chai Suri people in southern Ethiopia, before one of
their major raids on thé Nyangatom, a neighbouring ethnie group.5 Two
remarkable traits appear: first, a tone of scolding, typical of the speech of
elders towards juniors; and second, a multiple référence to violent action.
Such speeches are a regulär feature of the political discourse and of the cycle
of political activiries amongst the Chai agro-pastoralists.
The purpose of this chapter is to give a contextual ethnographie account
and explanation of the political process in a small-scale society and of the
practical rôle of rhetoric in it. It may be interesting to present a comparative
study showing how basic forms of political behaviour are being constituted
in a society at the margins of a globalising world and only superficially
linked with a national (Ethiopian) state structure. The subject has added
relevance as a result of the growing frequency of violent behaviour of Suri
in their dealings with others and among themselves. I will specifically
address the issue of whether and to what extent this violence (i.e., using
intimidating or physically harmful acts of a contested nature, inflicted on
other persons) is connected to, or predicated upon, éléments within the
political life of the Suri.
Owing to the work of anthropologists in numerous cultural settings,
much is now known about the genera! outlines of the political process and
4 Old three- or five-shot Männlicher rifles.
5 Ngorkana Woletula, on 23 February 1992, Makara. Transcribed from a tape-recording.
rhetoric in small-scale, non-literate societies (for some important examples,
see Bloch 1975, Paine 1981, Bailey 1983, Myers & Brenneis 1984, Turton
1992). The basic structures of political speech and rhetorical persuasion seem
to be similar across various cultural traditions, although they are
recognisably stamped by the variables of social scale, cultural tradition,
socio-économie conditions (egalitarianism vs. hierarchy) and the nature of
external relations (subjection vs. dominance vis-à-vis the state). The vital
importance of societies like the Suri and the Mursi (see below) is that they
provide micro-level examples of the workings of the political process in its
"elementary form", as rooted in basic social relations and human life
stratégies. From such studies we know, for instance, that enthymemic
persuasion (leaving certain things unstated) is an essential rhetorical
element in polities when its spokespersons or leaders want to mobilise for
united action on the basis of shared, implicit values (see Paine 1981:13, 21).
What speakers are saying in those debates is then mainly an exhortation to
doing (see also Myers & Brenneis 1984:11). In the Chai polity, this doing is
often the undertaking of a certain ritual or a certain form of violent action.
The Suri are an interesting case of a traditional society on the brink of
being drawn into the wider political structures of the Ethiopian state, while
still maintaining their distinctiveness as a relatively independent socio-
political unit. They are a group of ca. 28,000 shifting cultivators/cattle
herders in the savannah-bushland of southwestern Ethiopia (in the
Southern Peoples' Regional State, formerly Kafa région), living in ca. 40-45
villages ranging in size from a hundred to a few thousand people. Under
the terms of the latest Ethiopian Constitution (which came into effect in
August 1995) they are recognised as a separate ethnie group, allegedly with
its own "cultural and linguistic rights". This means représentation and co-
optation in the national administrative structures and a seat in the Fédéral
Parliament of the new Ethiopian Republic.6
On a micro-political level, the Suri (locally often called "Surma") can be
divided into two subgroups, the Tirma and the Chai (the largest).7 These
6 The Fédéral Parliament has two houses: the "Council of the Fédération" is the upper
chamber, composed of members of what are now cailed the various "nations, nationaiities
and peoples" of Ethiopia. It has no substantial political power and is basically under the
control of the Executive (the prime minister). The lower house is the "House of Peoples'
Représentatives" (HPR). Both were installed in 1995, after a nation-wide genera!
élection tightly controlled by the ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary
Democratie Front (EPRDF). As a "minority nationality", the Suri have one assigned
représentative in the HPR.
7 The third "Suri" group are the Baalé, ca. 8000 people mostly living in Sudan near and on
the Boma plateau. They form a separate political unit from the Tirma and Chai. Their
language differs substantially from Tirma-Chai (see Moges Yigezu & Dimmendaal, this
volume).
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units have their own territory, grazing areas, and agricultural fields. They
also have their own decision-making forums and initiation ceremonies
(e.g., for a "ruling" âge grade). In many respects, the Suri have always been
rather autonomous, having little contact with the Ethiopian state, which
only nominally incorporated their area in the late 1890s. In the 1980s,
several dozens of Suri young men served in the army of the Mengistu-
regime, speak Amharic, and have primary and some secondary éducation.
But their influence on the traditional political and social System of the Suri
has not been very pervasive. After their return in 1990-1991, they have
been re-absorbed into Suri society. They re-adapted to its norms and
customs, built up their herds, participated in the rituals, and tried to marry
and start a family.8
In the Maji area of Ethiopia, the Suri have acquired a "bad réputation". In
recent years, they have been involved in numerous violent conflicts with
their neighbours, who consist of diverse ethno-cultural groups like the Dizi,
the Me'en, the Anyuak, the Toposa, the Nyangatom and also the people of
mixed northern origin living in a handful of highland villages in this area.
(See Maps l and 2 on pages 8 and 76 for the geographical location of these
groups.) The Suri have consistently been accused of "causing problems":
arbitrary killings, ambushes, livestock raids, thefts of grain, honey and other
property, and refusing to live in peace with others (cf. Abbink 1993b). They
have the aura of being an "unruly, ignorant and uncivilised group of
people", especially in the eyes of the villagers, the state administrators, and
most Dizi. In this local discourse, what is seen as cause and effect are often
confused: either thé Suri are said to be uncivilised because "they cannot
control their aggression and violence", or they are violent because they are
"still uncivilised".
There is also substantial violent tension within Suri society itself,
although this usually does not have fatal conséquences (cf. Abbink 1994).
They hâve mechanisms of self-control which are lacking in their dealings
with outsiders. The latter are outside thé ritual bounds of Suri society, and
also outside thé "moral community". The question of why Suri violence
has become so çonspicuous in récent years, and whether it is a common
feature of their political System, might be answered by considering thé
changing conditions in and around Suri society, the characteristics of their
8 In 1995-1996, thé régional government of thé Southern Régional State has created a
"Sunna woreda" (district), and a corresponding "Surma Council" to act as a kind of local
authority. This was in accordance with thé policy of having ethnie groups represented by
"their own" members. Some of thé young men who speak Amharic as well as some other
Suri men of influcence were appointed in thé Council after internai élections. They receive
a government salary for their membership and activities.
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political debating and political action, and their norms and représentations
of violence.
An obvious case for comparison are thé Mursi. This group of ça. 5,000
people, living across thé Omo River to thé east of the Chai Suri, are closely
related to them, speaking the same language, with dialect différences. They
have been well described by anthropologist David Turton in a number of
fascinating articles, two of which deal directly with public oratory and
politics (Turton 1975, 1992). In several Granada films on thé Mursi (Turton
& Woodhead 1974, 1991), the subject was also treated in a penetrating
manner. To Turton's accounts, based on a large corpus of speeches and
oratory among this group, perhaps not much may be added in terms of
explanatory analysas of political life and rhetoric, and my present essay will
show overlap with his arguments.
While Turton's work is concerned with the functional and formal
properties as well as the social context of public debate, I will reflect in
particular on the relation between Chai debating and public gathering as it
relates to what I see as cycles of âge-set tension and of violence in this type
of society (i.e. primarily Chai, Tirma, Mursi, and Baalé, but in principle also
recognisable among similar groups in Eastern Africa marked by relatively
egalitarian social structure, livestock-holding, a bridewealth system, and
substantial socio-economic and political autarky). Both the Chai and the
Mursi can be seen as relatively autonomous political units with a sense of
distinctiveness and solidarity. This holds for these two groups in relation to
their Su (highland farmers, mainly Dizi or Dime people) and pastoral
neighbours, but also in relation to each other. However, in the case of the
Chai, it will be of interest to recall their "ritual bonds" with thé Dizi (cf.
Abbink 1994:71), which show that they were certainly not a political isolate.
2. Political structure: The âge grades and thé komoru
The Suri were and still are a largely "acephalous", non-hierarchical society,
i.e. without centralised political authority or thé institution of chiefs: they
hâve no dominant leaders with executive powers. In their démocratie
order, there is no notion of "sovereignty" nor of its délégation to a higher
authority. There is an idéal of equality among adults, but it is structured by
gender and âge. The term equality hère refers to thé undeniable "relative
political autonomy of actors" (Myers & Brenneis 1984:11). Girls and married
women, although at the centre of domestic units and households,
effectively forming thé framework of social life, do not participate directly
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in the most important public debates.9 The basic criterion to distinguish
people and to accord them adult status and respect is âge-grade position. The
notion of a "suprême authority" does not exist; it is deflected towards the
komorü, a mediator figure who has a kind of neutral, ritually facilitating
position. His position is due to descent from a certain clan line and to
personal character, not to bravery, personal feats in battle, political
manipulation, wealth, etc. The komorü has no political office or authority,
but is primarily a ritual figurehead,10 a conciliator, a point of ritual and
moral référence of the society as a whole. On account of nis position, he is
considered as having a quality called bàràri, i.e. 'hot', possessing extra
power.11 This "power" is applied for healing, blessing, reconciliation and
initiation purposes.
In the political process, most prestige and influence is accorded
traditionally to a "reigning" set of elders of the rorà âge grade and to one of
senior or "retired" elders (bara). They are the backbone of political society, to
be respected and honoured on occasion by the junior set of (uninitiated)
men called tègay.12 Women are accorded authority, respect and prestige in
connection with the age-grade status of their husbands, but are not initiated
separately. Such a set of elders (not determined by biological génération and
age) has a collective name, marking them off from their predecessors. Until
December 1994, the reigning set was that of neebi (i.e., the 'buffaloes'). As
villages and territorial settlements are usually made up of domestic units
with members from all the clans of the Chai, one may find members of the
ruling age grade in any such place. Within this population of neebi, there
are a limited number of men with an outstanding position.
The locations for political discussions and décisions are the sedentary
villages, where most of the róra (and the women and young children)
réside. The village of Makara, where the Chai komorü lives, is the scène of
the most important debates, especially when a subséquent ritual blessing is
to be given. The young men of the tègay-grade usually stay with the
livestock in the lowlands, moving around with the herds and living in
make-shift camps, one or two days' distance from the villages. This "dual"
seulement structure of the Chai is notably different from, for example, the
Mursi pattern, and has an impact on the political process. The senior tègay
9 Women have their own livestock (although they do not herd them) and have a large say
in where fields should be cleared and what should be planted and when,
I ° Turton (1975:180) refers to him as a "priest". See also Abbink (1997) on Surma leadership.
II Several ritually important plants are also said to be barari.
12 This compares with the Mursi, who also speak of róra, bära (and an additional set of
oldest elders, karo), and teru (for tègay). The Suri have a set of children or youngsters
below the tègay, called liisi. Strictly speaking, the Sun have no more than these four
grades. The Mursi are said to distinguish seven (cf. Turton 1973:125).
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among them could formally participate in the debates, but due to this
distance, they are not often capable of doing so. Still, between these two
sections, frequent contact is maintained by both men and women (especially
youngsters) travelling to and fro between villages and cattle camps for
reasons of, e.g., exchanging of news, visiting relatives and friends, drinking
of milk or blood from the cattle, or supplying food from the villages
(sorghum beer, grain porridge).
The ruling age-set (or teny) of róra is replaced every 25 to 30 years. The
norm seems to be every 15 to 20 years, but the last three ceremonies among
the Chai all had a large interval between them: the neebi were initiated in
the dry season of I960;13 their predecessors, called Bi-Kambo, before the
Italian occupation of 1936, around 1932. The approaching of the time for a
new set ceremony is of major importance, as it générâtes pressure on
especially the elders to prépare its initiation and préparé the tègay and other
Suri for this major realignment in social and age-group relations.
Indeed, one of the central theses of this essay is that the tension building
up within the political system of societies like the Chai in itself générâtes
internai rivalry as well as external violence, both éléments being reflected
in the political cycle of discussion and debate. Apart from that, the
relationship between rdrà and tègay itself is one of a certain "ritual
servitude", where the latter have to demonstrate to the former their valour
and value as adults and as responsible people. Elsewhere I have stressed
(following Tornay's insights) the importance of the metaphor of (sacrificial)
violence underlying this relationship (Abbink 1994:73).
3. The nature of Chai political life: "Leaders", debates and action
In the anthropology of politics, attention has shifted from earlier social-
structural and transactionalist views of political procedure, networks, and
power relations to the analysis of "discourse" and rhetorical stratégies in
political manoeuvring (e.g., Paine 1981, Brenneis & Myers 1984, Strecker
1990). While the latter strand of thinking has contributed decisively to the
understanding of the process of politics, there is a danger that social and
material conditions constraining the rhetorical process and the strategie
choices expressed in political discourse are given only secondary place. In
the case of the Chai, it is evident that only a dialectical view gives a füll
picture. Political behaviour - defined here as the behaviour of a collectivity
concerned with the définition and réalisation of perceived common goals
and rights and the delineation and defence of the group against perceived
I.e., one year before the ceremony for the Mursi set, called Benna
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outsiders - is conditioned by the interplay of, on the one hand, structural
norms and "rules of the game", and, on the other, socio-economic
conditions which détermine the formation of interests and conflicts of
interests of the actors. Implicit in this définition is that the détermination of
the "perceived common goals" présupposes a process of social reproduction
and of social validation. Myers and Brenneis (1984:4) have rightly argued
that "... people's relationships to sources of social value and to the processes
that generate it" are important when analysing "politics".
The changing external conditions of Chai society decisively contribute to
the formation of assertive political behaviour in word (expressive
discourse) and deed (violence to achieve individual or group aims). The
goals of "political behaviour" (see above) are predominantly defined on the
basis of the protection and growth of their crucial means of livelihood -
cattle and crops (sorghum, maize, beans) - and of their fertility - safety of
children, expansion of families. These core concerns are buttressed by the
Chai's staunch pride in and their feeling of superiority about their way of
life and their culture. They hold it in a much higher esteem than that of the
agricultural neighbours like the Nyangatom, the Dizi or "Su", and the
highland village people who are called "Golach". This pride is evident in
their aesthetic practices (especially body culture) and their moral
imagination, which define a clear cultural boundary with these neighbours.
A violent imagination is part of Suri life, not necessarily because they are,
in comparison to others, a violently disposed people, but because of a socio-
cultural response, codified in their culture, to their position as a herding
people in a vulnérable environment both with regard to natural and
human conditions. As a pastoral people with a partly mobile way of life, a
decentralised social organisation, and a vigorous commitment to livestock
as thé crucial store of wealth and a means of forging social relationships,
there is an ethic of independence and assertiveness, both among men and
women. Customs also known from other East African herding peoples,
such as bodily culture among youngsters, thé "favourite song-ox"14 called
be-a-kèrègi (in which many personal émotions are concentrated), a strong
bond between unmarried âge-mates, or ritual fighting, maintain a militant
and vigilant behavioural pattem. Violence in both ritual and acrual form is
thus an important feature of this society, evidently seen in thé mourning
and purification rituals (killing of cattle) as well as in the texts of the many
songs about cattle, initiation, or marriage. These all évince a militant and
self-conscious group identity. Indeed, their self-name "Chai" was explained
as meaning 'people who avenge, who pay back' (i.e., any insuit, theft, or
14 Remarkably, among thé Suri it is more commonly a song-bull, rather than a song-ox.
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killing). Violence is also a constant underlymg point of référence m thé
political process.
As mentioned above, Suri politics is exercised through public debate
(within thé structure outlined above). Among both Suri and Mursi, a
similar distinction of kinds of public talk and debate can be made. Turton
(1975:170) mentions the term methe for a "... meeting at which a number of
men discuss some issue which is public in thé sensé that it may be assumed
to affect all members of thé community equally", and later goes on to divide
this into two types: a 'discussion pure and simple' and a 'debate' (which has
the added characteristic of some kind of ritual action, usually a stock animal
being killed and thé intestines read; ibid.:170-171). The Chai call thé major
debates and meetings with such an aspect of formality also mèthi or mèzi
(dialect différence). Their public debates, however, seldom add thé intestine
reading. Only at some rare, really major, occasions this is done.15
Any décision or course of action of some weight among thé Chai is taken
or validated in a mèzi, which is always held at a recognised public meeting
place, thé doggô. Any adult man (hiri-mü) can take part in such a debate and
many do (not the younger tègay and thé lûsi, thé âge grade of the boys), but
thé debate is dominated by some influential, senior rorà and bâra. However,
thé Suri do not know thé Mursi term jalabäi for such authoritative
speakers. They hâve another concept, gulsà, for village 'leaders' who are
confirmed in their position by thé komorii, but thèse are not by définition
good public speakers, nor are ail influential speakers among thé Chai gulsà.
The topics discussed in a mèzi are: thé movement of herds, décisions on a
reconaissance trip or a cattle raid into 'enemy territory' (i.e. that of the
Nyangatom or Toposa), décisions on seeking reconciliation with a
neighbouring group, thé location of a village or of fields for thé crops, thé
formulation of a response to government directives, or thé décision to hold
a major ritual, such as an initiation ceremony. As Turton already remarked
in his first study of oratory among the Mursi, the outcomes of the mèzi may
often seem like "foregone conclusions" (Turton 1975:182; also 1992:163)' in
thé end, they may do no more than express thé community's joint feeling
on thé proper course of action. This does not imply that ail speakers say thé
same thing. On thé contrary: there is lively and substantial exchange of
views, but thé fact is that a majority opinion grows during a debate, which is
then accepted by ail those présent.16 A major mèzi would not be called if thé
rorà did not already know thé général outcome. In this sensé, the speeches
and rhetorical appeals made at the occasion, while éloquent and balanced,
15 One instance was the big five-day réconciliation meeting of Mursi and Chai m Apnl 1993
in thé village of thé Chai komorti (of which more to follow).
16 See the film, The Mursi (1974)
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only express a synthesis of talks, discussions and exchanges of opinion that
have preceded the mèzi. These speeches are a reflection of social processes
going on in thé community. It is on this preceding process that more
attention should be focused. The idea of considering the discussing and
debating process as an event with various stages is not new; Strecker, in his
brief but clear account of Hamar politics, also pointed to a 'spiral' of political
discourse (from conversation to divination to oratory to blessing/curse
(Strecker 1990:40). As such, it provides a further illustration of the pattern of
consensus formation in small-scale, non-centralised polities, although his
analysis was not meant to focus on thé process in a longer term-perspective.
The Hamar system is also somewhat different in that there is no 'ruling âge
grade' and no komorû intervening in thé process.
Observations of Chai life over a period of almost three years suggest that
there are several 'cycles' of polities in their society: those of the longe durée,
so to speak, relating to the span of the ruling âge-set, and those of short
duration, on the basis of thé productive year, called oyô. The long-term cycle
is that of thé séquence of named âge grades, and of the spécifie "ruling" set
in particular. The Chai are very conscious of this cycle. If they speak of the
past and thé future, e.g. of political relations with their neighbours or with
the Ethiopian state, they always relate it to thé 'reign' and thé achievements
of a spécifie âge grade. They also judge thé performance of various régimes
in Ethiopia (the Menilik-Zewditu era, the Italians, emperor Haile Sellassie,,
thé Dergue, thé new EPRDF) agaihst their own cycle, and in fact their
historical memory of ail thèse régimes is quite lively. Important is also that
every spécifie set has its own life cycle and mémorable events, of which
people are equally aware. It is unclear whether developments in thé wider
(Ethiopian) society have any influence on thé Chai décision as to when a
rorà initiation ceremony should be held. Some initiations were held just
before a big change in Ethiopian national politics, some shortly thereafter.
I now outline the political talk held in the short cycle, i.e., every year in
connection with, and as a préparation of, the important mèzi's.
An important first phase is the common 'gossip' or 'playful talk' (tirayn
or tirâyndô, as the Chai and Mursi say, see Turton 1975:170), mingled with
news about what is happening in the country, either concerning the cattle,
other economie activities, visitors, and developments among neigbouring
groups (in our case especially among the Nyangatom, the Dizi, and in the
highland villages). It can be aired by anybody, both male and female, and
occurs during any public collective gathering, such as a work party, a
wedding, an organised stick-duel, a group market visit, or the almost daily
talk under the village shade trees. The tone in such public gossip talks
alternâtes between quiet reflection on and exchange of information on the
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one hand, and the expression of irritation or indignation about certain
events and actions on the other. Indeed, this kind of gathering is one in
which émotions are least controlled. The typical social groups of such play
talk are an extended family, a work team, age-mates and friends, or herding
groups. Here the désire or need for larger meetings is gradually built up.
When some events or developments are thought to merit wider
reflection, they are brought up in minor meetings, which the Chai call not
mèzi but logo, literally 'word' or 'dispute'. These are more serious gatherings
in a central place in a village where groups of people mixed according to
gender or âge (excluding the lusi, who are not considered adults) discuss
matters which 'require some action', or things which 'should be corrected',
etc. Although hère, as in tirâyndô, equality of participation is evident, again
the adult men predominate. Norms and values are invoked and precedent
cases are discussed. The typical group here is the local or village community
and the Buran, the territorial herding unit (of which there are eight in Chai).
In most villages of the Chai, such a logo is held at regulär intervals of rwo to
four weeks, and they are often used as the sound boards for larger meetings
and often for a mèzi preceding collective action. These logo's are also the
gatherings in which important news is transmitted. However, they do not
lead to a clear conclusion and the komorû does not give a final summing up.
An intestine-reading is never held. But elders of the rorà grade, judging the
swell of talk and sometimes the grievances in the village communities,
gradually become convinced that 'soon' a mèzi must be held. In fact, there is
an intricate diajßctic between the lesser logo's and the mèzi's.
This last stage, a mèzi - which is evidently the most 'formal' occasion of
the three - may have two forms (see above, Turton's distinction): either a
minor debate, to formalise décisions and course of action (often in response
to a major challenge, from either neigbouring groups or government
inquiries and plans), or a major debate, concluded by an intestine-reading or
a ritual blessing. These mèzi's are characterised by forceful, controlled
speech, with strong rhetoric and repeated injunctions to action. Men from
various Buran participate in these mèzi's. Debates of both types are summed
up by the komorü, expressing the common-denominator opinion emerging
in the debate in a careful and often admirable speech. The "final" debate is
often one in which the community is unanimously decided on a risky or
violent course of action. The genuine mèzi's are held in only two villages in
Chai: in Makara, the village of the komorü Dolloté, and in Bi-Jagaré, the
village of the most prestigieus elder of the neebi-set, Arsi-Goloni. This elder
has the only remaining "sacred drum" (kitforj) of the Chai in his possession.
According to the developmental stage of the ruling age-set, the different
forms of discussion have a different impact. When the ruling âge grade is
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still "fresh", the frequency of logo and mèzi is limited. When the set
advances in time and the number of té gay - those who are getting older,
marry and have children, and acquire all the important tasks of herding,
defence, and other economie activities - is growing, pressure on, or tension
with, the róra mounts. Many róra get older and no longer participate in
activities like raiding, herding, or cultivating. They may also have
grandchildren who start "knocking at the gâtes" - demanding cattle for
bridewealth, etc. This gives rise fax the planning and évaluation of actions of
the tègay, who get a more central rôle in Chai life. Toward the last period of
the age-set's life, a process of discussion starts about whether and when the
time is ripe for the considération of a new initiation ceremony for tègay.
This process may take several years. It is also during this stage that the
internai political function of the mèzi's becomes clear: they are a forum to
validate unified action against outsiders, but also to bring fellow Chai into
line. In this sense, it is an arena to "eut down arrogance"; in other words, to
prevent certain people from becoming too important.
In this last period mentioned, the situation in itself générâtes not only
internai tension, but also challenging and often reckless behaviour of
sections of the tègay, who wish to prove themselves through violent
performance. An institution exists in which this "reckless behaviour" is
allowed, but in a controlled and ritual marmer: the sàgine or cérémonial
stick-duelling. Nevertheless, young men continue to go on raids to acquire
cattle and on game-hunting expéditions, or to kill individual members of
other groups in order to enhance their prestige among peers. This effort to
distinguish themselves vis-à-vis others in order to create a boundary or an
identity, is what happens both inside Chai society (vis-à-vis the elders) as
well as outside it (to create a political opposition with regard to
neighbouring groups): it is a traditional pattern and a concomitant of their
political process. This stands in relation to the paramount need for the
defence of herds and of family members as well as guaranteeing long-term
access to resources.
4. Suri politics at a crisis stage, 1985-1995
In the past decade, internai and external changes have been occurring which
have increased the violent aspects of Chai political expression.
The background of the state of turmoil of the Chai polity17 should be
briefly sketched. First of all, they have a longstanding conflict with the ca.
17 The same holds for the Tirma. The Tirma and the Chai are seen as one polity by the state
administration.
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13,000 Nyangatom or "Bume", their southern agro-pastorahst neighbours
Until some ten years ago the Suri dominated the Nyangatom, but since the
influx of large quantities of modern automatic rifles (reaching the
Nyangatom first) and an alliance of Toposa and Nyangatom (who are
culturally and linguistically similar), the Chai (and Tirma) have been
raided, defeated, and chased from territories they formerly held. In contrast
to earlier observations that pastoralist groups do not consciously expand to
conquer territory (Tornay 1979:115), the Nyangatom have effectively
occupied and incorporated essential pastures and land of the Suri both in
Sudan and in Ethiopia, and have pushed them out of their strongholds
around Shulugui (Mt. Naita, see Map l on page 8). This was the area where
their most famous ancestors were buried and where they held the age-grade
ceremonies of the past. The loss was thus not only of economie importance
(lost pastures) but also of' major cultural significance. In the speech cited at
the beginning of this article, we see the reflection of a sentimental
attachment to their land, and of the prime symbolic rôle it has come to play
in the Chai collective memory.
The alliance of the Nyangatom with the ca. 60,000 Toposa (who are also
referred to as Bume) has been proven to be too formidable for the Suri. The
relationship between the two groups is now one of enmity and violence
only. There is no more resource sharing (e.g., of water holes and pastures)
nor social contact (e.g., all Bume-Suri ritual bond-friendships have been eut
off), and any prior balance between the two has ended.
Secondly, the Suri have been brought into closer contact with the Dizi,
Omotic-speaking agriculturalists on whose resource area they have
encroached. Many disputes and violent incidents have arisen, despite the
"historical agreement" (on "rain control", resource sharing) which exists
between the Dizi and the Suri. This agreement was based on the présumée!
kinship between the chiefly families of the Adikyaz Dizi and the komorii
clan (Komorténi) of the Chai (Abbink 1994). One can definitely discern an
element of resource compétition at work in generating the conflicts, but this
is not the only reason for the violence.
A third factor involved is that the Suri have also feverishly been
accumulating automatic weapons in the past eight years. The wide
availability and the nature of these weapons has been a factor m itself in
accelerating disruptive and destructive violence in the région as a whole:18
thé fire-power and deadly effect of the rifles is very seductive, reinforcmg
18 Cf. thé impact of a similar influx of weapons among the Pokot of North Kenya, described
by Bollig (1992: 353). Thèse weapons reached southern Ethiopia several years later than
northern Kenya, where ail groups were fully armed by thé early 1980s (Bollig 1992- 284-
85).
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Ideals of "warrior-hood" and intensifying the scale and nature of killings.19
The paradox is that the violence has been increasingly directed to the Dizi
and to other highlanders instead of against the Nyangatom (see Abbink 1994
for the possible reasons).
This situation of shifting group relations in the Maji area and of internai
tensions has thus stimulated a process of tègay taking violent initiatives of
their own, much beyond what was expected of them by the elders. The fact
that this tendency coincided with the final - always tense - stage of the
reigning age-set, was an aggravating historical circumstance: the traditional
tension between the younger and the senior âge grade, which is "endémie to
the system" (Turton 1992:165), was capitalised upon by the tègay, so much
so, that it even threatened the system itself.
Because of the geographical distance between herders and people in the
villages (see above), as well as the new opportunities of members of
especially the younger tègay to simply act independently and unauthorised
by the décisions made in mèzi's by seniors in the ruling neebi grade, there
occurred a kind of split in the system. The youngsters were inclined to assert
themselves by relying on the power of their rifles and on their growing
economie leverage (as herders, and as gold traders: see Abbink 1993a). Under
these circumstances, the use of violence - especially against the Dizi but also
among the Chai themselves - became more widespread than it had ever
been.20 The interesting thing about this split was that the tègay hardly ever
attended the big mèzi's in the villages. They had their own meetings - logo's
- at the cattle camps, where raids and ambushes were planned, on the Dizi
as well as on the Nyangatom herds. In other words, they showed a tendency
to develop "their own politics". Here, the power of traditional mèzi rhetoric
- rooted in the appeal to common values and aimed at common courses of
action - was temporarily weakened. For pragmatic reasons, the violence
against the Dizi - which, as we saw, was without provocation - was
criticised by the neebi elders in their speeches, because of its unproductivity
and of its endangering social relations, exchange, and the ritual rain-
agreement between the two peoples. Thus an extremely tense relationship
developed between neebi and tègay, which set the stage for all subséquent
political developments in the Chai polity and which tended to change the
terms of the relationship between the âge grades. Some Chai even expressed
19 The violent incidents over a three-year period (1991-1993) on which I have data yield a
rate of about 5 to 6 killings per 1000 inhabitants per year among Suri, Dizi, Nyangatom
and village people. At some stages (e.g. late 1994, early 1995, 1997) the killings were less
frequent, because of a lack of bullets and stricter government control.
20 This also in the eyes of the Chai themselves. A dialogue recorded by Marco Last and
Deborah Lucassen in January 1993 from two Chai youngsters reflects this (see Lucassen
1994; Last 1995 contains a slightly revised version of the same dialogue).
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the fear that the rorà initiation would have to be cancelled completely tf
their society continued to "derail".
5. Debating and violence in the present political conjuncture: A case-study
of a three-year cycle, 1991-1994
In local Chai political discourse, suffused with metaphors and appeals to
values from the domains of their traditional culture, an image of
normative political praxis is created. Part of this praxis is violence: the
"tamed violence" between territorial sections in the arena of cérémonial
duelling, and the violent defence of the own (Chai) group and its means of
existence. We already saw this aspect reflected in the speech cited at the start
of this essay. The underlying values are those of the integrity of the
domestic unit, reciprocity, complementarity of age groups, and group
solidarity. Due to the upheavals of the last decade, such values came under
gréât pressure, whereby traditional rhetorical appeals and persuasion
techniques used by the elder speakers at the debates became increasingly
questioned and challenged by the young. Their non-participation and their
independent action outside the validation structure of the big mèzi's was
perhaps the most serious challenge so far to any reigning rorà âge grade in
recent Chai history.
In this section, I present, by way of illustration, a summary outline of a
cycle of meetings and debates and its relation to escalating violence in the
years 1991-1994TThis period also marked the final phase of the age-set
"rule" of the neebi, who were replaced in December 1994. The impact of the
problems mentioned above were all reflected in the twelve or so major
public debates held in that period, and in the numerous gatherings in-
between. Only a few will be mentioned here.
The stage was set by the situation of increased tension and incidents,
between Chai-Tirma and Dizi on the one hand (since the Chai had settled
near the Dizi area in 1988), and Chai-Tirma and the Nyangatom (Bume) on
the other.
Two major confrontations took place in 1991. One was a raid on the
village of Kärsi in April, where 43 Dizi were killed in a Chai raid. The
second confrontation was an attack on the village of Kolu in September, in
which one prestigious Dizi chief, the Dishi-Gaaz, was hacked to death with a
machete by Chai youngsters. On both occasions, no reason was given,
although some property and cattle were stolen. Dizi appeals to the
government did not yield any result, so the Chai were not deterred. Both
raids were taken without any authorisation from a Chai mèzi; they were
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actions of a group of tègay, allegedly trying to settle scores (revenge) on their
own account. While Chai elders did not denounce thé culprits to thé
government or publicly scold them at a meeting, they did not approve of
this violence either. At various logo meetings in thé villages, differing
évaluations could be heard of these acts. That thé killings were not seen as
anything heroic could be concluded from the fact that none of the killers
received the honorific ridô scarification on his arm.
Later in 1991, a period of genera! insecurity followed the change of power
at the national level; the Dergue regime being replaced by that of the
insurgent movement EPRDF in May. For several months, there were no
effective police or army units active in the Maji area, and the ambushing by
Suri of Nyangatom (and vice versa) and particularly Dizi went on unabated.
The robbing of village traders, Dizi, and Me'en travellers (between Turn and
Jeba villages) became notorious. But there were also several classic livestock
raids on the Nyangatom, with dozens of casualties on both sides.
1. The moment to start considering the cycle of debates is during a big
duelling game (sâgine) in December 1991, held near the village of the
komorü. It was held after the end of the yearly cycle (óyo), which is a time
when the main sorghum and maize harvest are collected, and in the
middle of the main sâgine season, when most herders from the tègay-grade
are back in the villages. On the second and last day of this duel, a mèzi was
held, which dealt with the "Bume problem" as well as the invitation from
the new government to send delegates to Maji village to discuss the
problems of violence in the area. In this mèzi, the elders took a cautious
line: they suggested that the Chai would have to take a low profile and in
further contacts with the government they should bring up the problems
they had with the Bume. The ambushing and robbing on the roads and the
raids on villages were perpetrated by unknown people who could not be
controlled. At the same time, several speakers emphasised that the Su (i.e.,
the Dizi) were not "the enemy" and that they should not be targeted
without reason. When the komorü came forward to speak, all men present
rose to their feet. He then summed up and closed the meeting by stressing
these last points, and that they, the Chai, would send róra and tègay to Maji
to find out what was going on. He also spoke of the value of sâgine's, as a
training ground for tègay to gain physical strength and elementary fighting
skills, but immediately added that the enemies to be dealt with were still the
Bume, implying that it was ill-advised to make trouble with the Su.
2. A few days later, a big meeting was held in Maji between
représentatives of the government, the townspeople, Dizi, Me'en, and Suri
(Chai and Tirma as one). This kind of meeting cannot be compared with a
mèzi of the Chai, because it was a central state-organised gathering, where
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people do not meet as "equals". It could be said that the Chai perceived it as
"... a single will which imposes itself upon a multitude of others" (Strecker
1990:45), i.e. the opposite of their own political process, and thus they feit
less bound by it. A few dozen Suri people had made an appearance, in
comparison with about 300 Dizi, fifty non-Dizi townspeople, and about a
hundred Me'en. The Suri contribution to the meeting limited itself to
stating the case that they needed their weapons, which they were accused of
abusing constantly. They argued that they used them to défend themselves
against the Bume - they could not surrender them to the government (as
was requested earlier). They also avoided discussing any concrete case of
violent assault or robbery which was put forward by Dizi and townspeople.
The soldiers of the EPRDF-administration were too new to the area to
understand all the details of the local situation and spoke in genera! terms
about the need to leave the past behind and start anew from a peaceful
situation. They also warned that stolen property should be returned and
that no one should be killed on the road or in a raid. At this meeting, which
was basically a statement of positions without a consensus emerging, the
Suri found no reason for any "commitment" to what was said or decided.
The Suri called it a logo: an exchange of views, no conclusion
3. After the challenge of the government, the Chai were inclined to
devote more attention to raiding of the Bume. This is at least what appears
to have been the case in the months after this Maji meeting. Several minor
meetings (logo) in Chai and Tirma villages led to two major mèzi's, both in
Chai and in Tjrjna, with respect to the Bume problem. They took place
before the large majority of tègay were to return to the cattle camps, and
during the meetings, the elders put up a major challenge to them to go to
the Bume area, and not make "cheap attacks on the Su". Some incidents
with the latter were inévitable, they said, but these highlanders should not
become a major concern of the Chai. One elder said:
Look at them, at the Su: they have no value. What is there in the highlands,
except bugs and mud? Are there cattle to guard? Is there pasture? .... There are
people moving into our land over there, in Lo'ong, in Wayanné:21 should this go
on?
This challenge was taken up by the tègay, who, during the meeting, stood
up and came forward with their rifle towards the speakers, singing the
name of their song-oxen or bulls (cf. the scène in the film The Mursi (1974)
and below, pt. 5). Following the mèzi and the ritual blessing given by the
komorü, there was a raid toward the Rongodö area (see Map l on page 8),
where Toposa-Bume herded their cattle.
21 Places near Mt. Shulugui.
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4. In 1992, the same ambivalent pattern of dual violence against Bume,
Dizi, and highlanders went on. On the trade-route between the villages of
Jeba and Turn and the hinterland, along which gold, grain, cattle, coffee,
honey, etc. were transported, ambush attacks became the order of the day.
However, the year was started with several raids on the Bume, which were
elaborately discussed and prepared. Among the various groups of tègay,
meetings were held to give substance to the expressed need "to do
something" about the Bume, or at least, keep pressuring them. In fact, after
several such meetings (the cycle of which is not discussed hère), a genera!
décision was reached: to move towards the village of the komorü, "attack"
his compound, and finally seek his blessing for a major raid.22 This ritual
and blessing is referred to as dirâm. The raiders were virtually all tègay (and
were, due to the long delay of the initiation, in their thirties, some reaching
their f orties).
In one crucial meeting in February 1992, the words cited at the opening of
this article were spoken by Woletula Ngorkana, one of the chief róra elders.
As in the Mursi speech cited by Turton (1992:166-168), we recognise the
three common style figures (distinguished by Turton, ibid.) with which the
senior elder formulâtes the appeal to the younger génération: rhetorical
questions, use of metaphor, and références to the past. Through these, the
central rhetorical function of such a political speech - the forceful
articulation of inévitable consensus, the prescribed rôle of the tègay, and the
assertion of Chai group identity - is vindicated. This was the core speech at
the meeting, and apart from its classical rhetorical aspects, it was also a very
direct appeal. It was not the typical speech of a debate: not one opinion
among many, contestable and tentative, but more of a rehearsing of the
inévitable conclusion that a violent response was the only thing to do. As
we argued above, this directly relates to the structure of the âge-grade System
and its overall social normative function in Chai society.
After Ngorkana's speech, the komorü gave the warriors his blessing. He
summarised the thème of Ngorkana's speech and concluded by saying:
Do not spill your bullets hère, go and shoot them at Shulugui.
Arise, anse: aren't the Bume our enemy? Is there any fear on your side?
Our cattle were being taken all the time - is this to go on?
Fear will not grip you. The road is there; our weapons are here.
They were my enemies, enemies of us all.
Why, up to now, did we not go?
We are like this, ready to go!
See also the film, The Mursi (1974), m which a similar scène ("spearing the komorü") is
depicted. But it is somewhat different from the Chai custom.
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Again, the words represent a direct appeal - predictable and irréfutable - to
the tègay. It is an appeal not to waste energy and direct their force to a proper
cause. The first line was a référence to the reprehensible tendency of
youngsters to fire their rifles at weddings, burials, public gatherings and
duelling places, as well as at the Dizi.
In the subséquent two months four raids were made on Bume herds and
settlements, leading to dozens of human casualties and the acquisition of
livestock. Nevertheless this did not cause a change in regional power
relations.
5. In June 1992, a new challenge presented itself in the form of the visit of
a Mursi délégation with the aim of forming an alliance with the (well-
armed) Chai. Space is insufficient here to discuss properly the relationship
of Chai and Mursi. But the point is that, despite their close historical
relationship, there has been no lack of violent incidents between the two
groups over the past two decades. In several preparatory meetings, attended
by members of various territorial groups from all over Chai country,
different views were heard on the proposed alliance. Some speakers were
against any deal proposed. One elder said:
... the Mun [i.e. Mursi, JA] are liars and robbers who took so many of our cattle
and killed Chai women without ever paying compensation (.. ) Did they help us
in the hunger period? Did we get grain from them when our people were dymg
like flies?
Nevertheless, the meetings led to a consensus that, in view of their
common problerrtsjvith the Nyangatom, an agreement was désirable. Long-
standing grievances between the two communities should be solved.23 In a
big mèzi on the fourth day of the visit, the agreement was reached. On the
fifth day, cattle were sacrificed in honour of the guests, the intestines read,
and, as is the custom of reconciliation, the peritoneum eut and worn
around the neck of the elders. Thus, the debate ended in the prescribed form
with a sacrifice and a ritual. This big meeting accomplished the renewal of
the historical link between Chai and Mursi, while at the same time
reconfirming their existence as separate political entities.
6. From 1992 until early 1994, the raids on the Bume abated, mainly
because of retaliatory counter-raids. At this point, the Chai and Tirma
realised that there was no chance of balancing their relationship with the
Nyangatom, in particular because of their alliance with the Toposa.
Incidentally, this problem also confirmed the fact that the Chai did not
know how to adapt their mode of battle warfare to the new possibilities and
demands of automatic weapons. Instead, they continued with their old hit-
The Mursi also wished to acquire automatic weapons and ammunition via the Chai
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and-run tactics and the occasional ambushing of groups of adversaries
(herding boys, isolated cattle camps, or villages). This yielded livestock, but
in Bume counter-attacks, most of the stolen animais were often lost again.
The Chai did not develop effective field-battle tactics, which would have
allowed them to regain territory and keep it.
Instead, the traditional pattern of violent attacks against Dizi went on,
unsanctioned by the Chai elders, Partly as a result of this, the neebi kept on
stalling the préparation of the new âge-set initiation ceremony. They tended
to perceive the tègay as too uncontrolled to take on róra-responsibility.
Implicit in their argument was the idea that tègay could at this point in time
even be seen as endangering the social reproduction of Chai society itself,
This idea was expressed in public meetings:
There were days when we hated to kill women and girls (....) How long will it
take for Dizi and Golach soldiers to do the same to us? Didn't our fathers say
so in those days: 'Is not one woman equal to ten men?'
7. That the neebi were largely correct in their assumptions became clear in
October 1993. Because of constant tègay violence against Dizi and
additionally provoked by a massive raid of Chai youngsters on the outlying
Dizi village of Kolu and the killing of an EPRDF-soldier, the Ethiopian
EPRDF-forces24 mounted a major battle against the Chai that month, in
which reportedly more than two hundred Chai (men, women, and
children) were killed. Thus, the escalated violence of, literally, an
"unleashed" génération of tègay in itself had grave political conséquences,
affecting the life of the Chai Community as a whole.
This was a central thème in a mèzi held a few weeks af ter this defeat.
Here, the neebi elders of several Buran's were the main speakers. They
evaluated the situation of the Chai. Their problems, including the period of
the famine in 1985, the Bume war in 1986-1987, government harrassment
in 1989-1990, and now the constant tension and uncontrolled violence with
the Dizi, were evoked dramatically. In no uncertain terms, the tègay were
blamed for their abysmal record, their failure to push back the Bume and
take their cattle, and their having provoked the death of many women and
children and the destruction of houses and crops. Thus, they were blamed
for having endangered Chai society itself. They alluded to events early in
the reign of the neebi in dealing with enemies (Bume), when, as they said,
people knew when to fight and raid or when to "offer a cow to a friend", i.e.,
to seek peace and to live together on good terms. They also recalled the
example of their forefathers, who had always returned to the same pasture
and water-hole sites, often shared with the Bume. In addition, they evoked
24 These forces also acted as the national Ethiopian army, starting from May 1991.
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the beneficia! effect of the alliance with the Dizi, who were related to them
and who - as relatives did - had often "provided rain" (through praying
ceremonies by the Dizi chiefs) and given grain to Chai in times of extreme
need. They asked themselves: "What was the purpose of aimless killing of
Dizi women, and of their elders?" In the search for reasons, however, some
of the elders mentioned that perhaps if the youngsters had received
responsibility earlier - i.e. if the neebi had not delayed the ceremony - it
might have prevented them from lapsing into the excessive violence of the
last years.
The final outcome was that the neebi were confirmed in their authonty.
Their admonitions to the youngsters about what could happen had been
proven right. One might even say that the action of the EPRDF troops thus
contributed to reinforce the perception of the validity of the traditional
political system of the Chai. In this respect, we see the inévitable dialectic
between internai and external factors, shaping the political process among
communities like the Chai.
8. After the attack, one additional factor led to a toning-down of tègay
violence: a serious famine in the Suri area in early 1994, caused by drought
and by the disturbance and neglect of normal agricultural activities during
the preceding period of tensions with the Dizi and with the government
troops. This set the stage for the neebi to press home the need to rearrange
the country, to "clean it", and to whip the tègay into submission by forcing
róra status upon them. The proposai that the initiation was to be held was
discussed and arranged during several meetings of neebi elders, without any
tègay attending. The komorü, who was a tègay, was also not present.
In late October 1994, Arsi-Goloni, the senior neebi elder, finally approved
the actual préparations for the ceremony: preparing the special branch
whips, selecting and delivering the cattle to be sacrificed, decidmg on the
location, and planning the order of events during the ceremony.
9. In December 1994, the róra initiation ceremony of the Chai was finally
held. It was a major five-day event, and a large-scale affair not to be
described here. The neebi elders did, however, give speeches to the
assembled tègay, and, according to informants, gave them one of the worst
series of insults and scoldings ever heard on such an occasion. Multiple
référence was made to the excessive, self-defeating violence against Su and
others, as well as to the failure of directing it against Bume. The elders
stated that a complete "cleansing" of the land, one that even their
forefathers had never seen, was necessary. Part of the ceremony (see also the
film Nitha (1991), on the Mursi ritual) was a ritual whipping with tree-
branches of the tègay initiands, who had to move around naked (without
any ornaments, etc.). This whipping was done not only ceremonially, but
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with excessive force and for several days, both by women and men of the
outgoing róra grade.
This verbal and physical violence, albeit in ultimately ritual form, was
the final closing stage of one of the most eventful and tumultuous periods
in the âge-grade cycle of the Chai. Tradition had perhaps been vindicated
with this change-over. Nevertheless, as a new cyle of events begins,
whether or not Chai violence will abate or not may largely dépend on
external relations of Chai society - with its natural environment,
neighbouring groups, and the state administration.
6. Conclusions and prospect
An important conclusion I want to make hère is that the nature of public
debate and thé choice of thé option of violence in societies like thé Chai -
with their norms of egalitarianism and unity and their formai age-grading
accompanied with its concomitant cultural ideals - in part hinges on thé
long-term political stage (as part of a larger cycle of political life) they find
themselves in. We saw that at the end of an âge-grade cycle a major
ambiguity arises with respect to thé initiation of a new ruling âge grade
("contested" both by thé tègay and by thé outgoing rorà, who seize upon this
major occasion to press their own éducative programme, so to speak). The
chance of violent tensions being acted out at that moment is much higher
than in "normal years" in thé middle of thé cycle. Having weathered thé
turbulent ritual change-over of grades, the society then enters a new a stage
of realignment and relative tranquillity.
Whether this predictable - and in its own terms, orderly - System of
power transfer will be maintained in the future dépends more and more on
the external environment in which the Suri are embedded. First, the
continued impact of environmental problems: the Suri remain vulnérable
to drought, cattle disease, erop failure, and local famine, endangering their
material basis of existence. Second, it can be expected that the ongoing
conflict with their pastoral neighbours, the Nyangatom and the Toposa,
whose encroachment on Suri grazing land, cultivation sites, and ritual
heartland around the Shulugui mountain has not been remedied until this
day,25 will provide a continued dynamic for thé Chai political system,.and
will underline thé relevance of violence in it. Third, it is likely that under
25 This is a problem not only of thé Suri but of the Ethiopian state as well: sooner or later the
authorities will have to deal with it, if thé declared policy of "ethnie democracy" and
régionalisation, which imply that people have at least the right to live in their own
territory, is to have any meaning.
i |
I
the influence of the encroaching state - which insists that thé Suri stop ail
kinds of public violence and aims to co-opt them in thé national political
and administrative process and the ethnic-political game - the Chai will be
developing new modes of political accommodation with state political
structures and programmes. This will affect the democratie nature and
freedom of action of their polity. In this respect, the Chai stand perhaps
more to lose than to gain. And in such circumstances, it may even become
doubtful whether a subséquent rorà grade - due in about 2020 - will ever be
initiated.
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The Koegu language is spoken in an area along the Omo River in the
extreme southwestern corner of Ethiopia by a small group numbering
around 300 indivicjuals, who call themselves Koegu (koegu). They are called
Muguji by the Kara (who speak an Omotic language), and Umucu by the
Bume (or Nyangatom, an Eastern Nilotic group).1
Koegu is one variant of the Kwegu-Muguji language or cluster, which
belongs to the Southeastern group within Surmic proper, which in turn is
part of the East Sudanic family within Nilo-Saharan. A further variant of
the Kwegu-Muguji cluster is Kwegu, which is spoken by another small
group, numbering probably no more than 300 individuals according to
Turton and Bender (1976). Kwegu is the selfname of this latter group; they
are called Nyidi by the Mursi and Yidi by the Bodi; Nyidinit or Yidinit is the
corresponding Singular form.
Haberland (1966) refers to a group by the name of Kwoygi, a caste of
hunters among the Dizi (an Omotic-speaking people). Lacking linguistic
Field research on the Koegu language was done in Ethiopia in 1987,1988,1989, and 1990,
through a grant from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, Japan, and in
coopération with the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University. When I
was engaged in my field research, the Koegu people were living in a village called
Kuchur, where they had gathered under a threat from neighbourmg people. Recently,
however, they abandoned their village, now livme scattered alone thp Omn Rivpr
